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We study the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control.
Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which an acquirer, once in control, can extract
private benefits at the expense of non-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases the acquirer’s capacity
to raise outside funds to finance the takeover. Absent effective competition for the target, the increased
outside funding capacity does not make efficient takeovers more likely, however, because the bid price,
and thus the acquirer’s need for funds, increase in lockstep with his pledgeable income. In contrast,
under effective competition, the increased outside funding capacity makes it less likely that the takeover
outcome is determined by the bidders’ financing constraints–and thus by their internal funds–and more
likely that it is determined by their ability to create value. Accordingly, stronger legal investor protection
can improve the efficiency of the takeover outcome. Taking into account the interaction between legal
investor protection and financing constraints also provides new insights into the optimal allocation
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Building on the seminal works of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), empirical studies have shown
that countries with stronger legal investor protection allocate resources more eﬃciently. Wur-
gler (2000) shows that countries with stronger legal investor protection increase investment
more in growing industries, and decrease investment more in declining industries, relative to
countries with weaker legal investor protection. Likewise, McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2010)
show that ﬁrms in countries with stronger legal investor protection exhibit a higher sensi-
tivity of investment to growth opportunities (q) and, as a result, enjoy higher total factor
productivity growth, higher revenue growth, and higher proﬁtability.
One important resource allocation mechanism is the takeover market. In that market,
both assets and managerial talent are (re-)allocated across ﬁrms. Indeed, consistent with the
studies cited above showing that countries with stronger legal investor protection allocate
resources more eﬃciently, Rossi and Volpin (2004) ﬁnd that these countries also have more
active takeover markets.
Existing theory oﬀe r sl i t t l eg u i d a n c ea st owhy t h et a k e o v e ro u t c o m em i g h tb em o r ee ﬃ-
cient in countries with stronger legal investor protection. This is for two reasons. First, ex-
isting takeover models do not explicitly consider legal investor protection. Second, empirical
research suggests that legal investor protection matters primarily because it relaxes ﬁnancing
constraints (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; McLean, Zhang, and Zhao, 2010).1 However–and
in stark contrast to the standard corporate ﬁnance model of investment (e.g., Tirole, 2006,
Chapters 3 and 4)–existing takeover models typically assume that bidders are ﬁnancially
unconstrained (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Hirshleifer
and Titman, 1990; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1998, 2000; Mueller and Panunzi, 2004).2
1La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with stronger legal investor protection have larger external
capital markets and more IPOs. McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2010) show that ﬁrms in these countries exhibit
both a lower sensitivityo fi n v e s t m e n tt oc a s hﬂow–meaning they are less ﬁnancially constrained–and a
higher sensitivity of either equity or debt issuance to q–meaning ﬁrms with better investment opportunities
are better able to raise outside funds: “These ﬁndings suggest that investment-sensitivity to q is stronger
in countries with greater investor protection in part because in these countries high q ﬁrms can more easily
obtain external ﬁnance to fund their investments” (p. 2).
2All these models build on Grossman and Hart’s (1980) seminal analysis of the free-rider problem in
takeovers. While Chowdhry and Nanda (1993)–in a model that assumes no free-rider problem–and Mueller
and Panunzi (2004) examine the strategic role of debt ﬁnancing in takeovers, neither of these two models con-
2To address this issue, we incorporate both legal investor protection and ﬁnancing con-
straints into a standard takeover model. In that model, no individual target shareholder
perceives himself as pivotal for the outcome of the tender oﬀer, leading to free-riding be-
havior. Consequently, target shareholders tender only if the bid price reﬂects the full post-
takeover share value (Bradley, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1980).3 However, if the bidder
cannot make a proﬁt on tendered shares, this implies that value-increasing takeovers may
not take place. As Grossman and Hart argue, one way for the bidder to make a proﬁti sb y
diverting corporate resources as private beneﬁts after gaining control of the target. Private
beneﬁt extraction lowers the post-takeover share value and thus the price which the bidder
must oﬀer target shareholders to induce them to tender their shares.
In our model, legal investor protection limits the ease with which the bidder can divert
corporate resources as private beneﬁts. This has two main implications. First, it reduces
the bidder’s proﬁtf r o mt h et a k e o v e r ,m a k i n ge ﬃcient–i.e., value-increasing–takeovers less
likely. Second, it increases pledgeable income by increasing the post-takeover share value,
thereby increasing the bidder’s outside funding capacity. However, absent eﬀective competi-
tion for the target, the increased outside funding capacity does not relax the bidder’s budget
constraint. As the bid price increases in lockstep with the post-takeover share value–to
induce target shareholders to tender their shares–the bidder’s need for funds increases one-
for-one with his pledgeable income, thereby oﬀsetting any positive eﬀect of legal investor
protection on the bidder’s outside funding capacity.
The conclusion that legal investor protection does not relax the bidder’s budget constraint
is disconcerting. After all, empirical research suggests that one of the main implications of
legal investor protection is that it eases ﬁnancing constraints. However, the conclusion follows
siders bidders’ ﬁnancing constraints. In particular, this implies that–in contrast to the standard corporate
ﬁnance model of investment–bidders’ own wealth is immaterial for eﬃciency.
3Rossi and Volpin (2004) provide empirical support for the free-rider hypothesis by showing that bid
premia in tender oﬀers are higher than in other takeover modes. The authors conclude (p. 293): “We
interpret the ﬁnding on tender oﬀers as evidence of the free-rider hypothesis: that is, the bidder in a tender
oﬀer needs to pay a higher premium to induce shareholders to tender their shares.” In a recent empirical
study, Bodnaruk et al. (2011) provide more direct evidence of the free-rider hypothesis. The authors show
that: (i) takeover premia are higher when the target’s share ownership is more widely dispersed, and (ii)
ﬁrms with more widely dispersed share ownership are less likely to become takeover targets. Both ﬁndings
are consistent with ﬁnite-shareholder versions of the free-rider model (e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988;
Holmström and Nalebuﬀ, 1992).
3naturally in any setting in which the bid price increases in lockstep with the post-takeover
share value and thereby with the bidder’s pledgeable income. Turning this result on its head,
if the bid price did not increase in lockstep with the bidder’s pledgeable income, then the
positive eﬀect of legal investor protection on the bidder’s outside funding capacity might have
implications for eﬃciency. A situation in which this arises naturally is bidding competition,
where the bidders are forced to make oﬀers exceeding the post-takeover share value. As
private beneﬁts are not pledgeable, oﬀers exceeding the post-takeover share value must be
(partly) funded out of the bidders’ internal funds. Consequently, the takeover outcome not
only depends on the bidders’ willingness to pay–i.e., their valuations for the target–but it
m a ya l s od e p e n do nt h e i rability to pay.
If bidders are arbitrarily wealthy, the takeover outcome depends exclusively on the bid-
ders’ willingness to pay. This is the situation analyzed in much of the theory of takeovers.
A st h em o s te ﬃcient bidder–i.e., the one who can create the most value–has the highest
valuation for the target, he can always outbid less eﬃcient rivals. Thus, absent ﬁnancial
constraints, the takeover outcome is always eﬃcient.
By contrast, if bidders are ﬁnancially constrained, the takeover outcome may be ineﬃ-
cient. As an illustration, suppose there are two bidders, bidder 1 and bidder 2 The target
value is normalized to zero. If bidder 1 gains control, the target value increases to 100 while
if bidder 2 gains control, it increases only to 90 Thus, bidder 1 is more eﬃcient. Suppose
next that both bidders can, once in control, divert the same fraction of ﬁrm value, say, 30
percent, as private beneﬁts. Hence, if bidder 1 gains control, the post-takeover share value is
70 and his private beneﬁts are 30 Likewise, if bidder 2 gains control, the post-takeover share
value is 63 and his private beneﬁts are 27 Thus, bidder 1 is not only more eﬃcient, but he
can also raise more outside funds: bidder 1’s outside funding capacity is 70 while bidder 2’s
outside funding capacity is only 63 (Recall that private beneﬁts are not pledgeable.) And
yet, bidder 2 may win the takeover contest. Speciﬁcally, assume bidder 1 has no wealth,
while bidder 2 has own wealth of 8 In this case, bidder 1 is able to pay 70 for the target,
while bidder 2 is able to pay 71:h ec a nr a i s e63 from outside investors and use 8 of his own
wealth. Consequently, bidder 2 can outbid bidder 1 and win the takeover contest.4
4Bidder 1 is willing to pay up to 100 for the target, while bidder 2 is willing to pay up to 90. Hence, if
4In sum, if bidders are ﬁnancially constrained, the takeover outcome not only depends on
the bidders’ ability to create value, but it may also depend on their wealth. In particular,
if the less eﬃcient bidder–i.e., the one who can create less value–is wealthier, the takeover
outcome may be ineﬃcient. In this case, stronger legal investor protection can improve
eﬃciency. To continue with the example, suppose that legal investor protection is now
stronger, allowing bidders to divert only 10 percent of ﬁrm value as private beneﬁts. As
a result, bidder 1’s outside funding capacity is now 90 while bidder 2’s outside funding
capacity is now 81 If the bidders’ wealth is the same as before, this implies that bidder 1
can now pay 90 for the target, while bidder 2 can only pay 81 + 8 = 89 Thus, bidder 1 can
outbid his less eﬃcient rival, bidder 2
As the example shows, stronger legal investor protection can promote eﬃcient takeover
outcomes. By boosting bidders’ ability to raise outside funds against the value they can
create, it makes it more likely that the most eﬃcient bidder wins the takeover contest.
We explore a number of implications of our analysis, both normative and positive. Under
a “one share—one vote” rule, all shares have equal voting rights. The leading argument in
favor of this rule is that it minimizes the likelihood that less eﬃcient bidders with higher
private beneﬁts can outbid more eﬃcient bidders with lower private beneﬁts (Grossman and
Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988). In our model, this argument does not apply, as the most
eﬃcient bidder has also the highest private beneﬁts. Nonetheless, a “one share—one vote”
structure is socially optimal in our model as it minimizes the likelihood that less eﬃcient
but wealthier bidders can outbid more eﬃcient but less wealthy bidders. Naturally, this
argument is absent from the models of Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv
(1988), as both models assume that bidders are arbitrarily wealthy. Moreover, we show
that departures from “one share—one vote” are more likely to lead to an ineﬃcient takeover
outcome when legal investor protection is weak.
We next examine sale-of-control transactions in which a bidder seeks to acquire a ma-
jority of the target’s shares from a controlling shareholder (“incumbent”). Eﬀectively, the
incumbent is like a rival bidder who is arbitrarily wealthy: he can always “aﬀord” the con-
trolling block by simply refusing to sell it. As we show, eﬃcient sales of control are more
the bidders were ﬁnancially unconstrained, bidder 1 would always win the takeover contest.
5likely to succeed when the controlling block is large. In a second step, we endogenize the
size of the controlling block and show that it is larger when legal investor protection is weak.
This is consistent with empirical evidence by La Porta et. al (1998, 1999) showing that
ownership is more concentrated in countries with weaker legal investor protection.
We ﬁnally examine issues related to cross-border M&A. In a typical cross-border M&A
transaction, the target adopts the corporate governance structures, accounting standards,
and disclosure practices of the country of the acquirer. As we show, if bidders from diﬀerent
countries compete for a target, those from countries with stronger legal investor protection
have a strategic advantage in the takeover contest. Holding the bidders’ wealth and their
ability to create value ﬁxed, bidders from countries with stronger legal investor protection
can extract fewer private beneﬁts, implying a higher post-takeover share value. This boosts
their outside funding capacity, allowing them to outbid rivals from countries with weaker
legal investor protection. Our model predicts that takeover premia in cross-border M&A
deals are increasing in the quality of legal investor protection in the country of the acquirer,
which is consistent with empirical evidence by Bris and Cabolis (2008).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 considers the case
of a single bidder. Section 4 analyzes bidding competition. Section 5 considers implications
of our analysis for the optimal allocation of voting rights, sales of controlling blocks, and
cross-border M&A transactions. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a model of takeovers in which potential acquirers are ﬁnancially constrained.
Suppose a ﬁrm (“target”) faces a potential acquirer (“bidder”). The target has a measure
one continuum of shares, which are dispersed among many small shareholders. (Section 5.2
considers the case in which the target has a controlling shareholder.) All shares have equal
voting rights. (Section 5.1 considers departures from “one share—one vote.”) Shareholders
are homogeneous, everybody is risk neutral, and there is no discounting.
The target value is normalized to zero. If the bidder gains control of the target, its value
increases to 0 To gain control, the bidder must make a tender oﬀer to the target’s
6shareholders that attracts at least a majority of the target’s shares. (The bidder has no
initial stake in the target.) Target shareholders are atomistic in the sense that no individual
shareholder perceives himself as pivotal for the outcome of the tender oﬀer. Tender oﬀers
are conditional on acquiring at least a majority of the target’s shares and unrestricted in the
sense that the bidder is willing to acquire any and all shares beyond this threshold. If the
tender oﬀer is successful, the bidder incurs an execution cost,  that cannot be imposed on
the target or its shareholders (unless the target is fully owned by the bidder, in which case
the assumption becomes irrelevant).5
Even if a control transfer is eﬃcient ( ) it may not take place. As Bradley (1980)
and Grossman and Hart (1980) point out, if no individual target shareholder perceives him-
self as pivotal for the outcome of the tender oﬀer, eﬃcient takeovers will not materialize
unless the bidder can extract private beneﬁts once in control. Accordingly, we assume that,
after gaining control, the bidder can divert a fraction (1 − ) of the target value as private
beneﬁts, where  ∈
£¯ 1
¤
is a choice variable. For simplicity, we assume that private beneﬁts
cause no deadweight loss. Thus, the bidder’s private beneﬁts are (1−) while the security
beneﬁts accruing to all shareholders, including the bidder himself, are  Importantly, pri-
vate beneﬁts cannot be contracted upon. This implies the bidder cannot commit to a given
level of private beneﬁts, nor can he transfer or pledge these beneﬁts to third parties (e.g.,
investors).6 Instead, the legal environment–captured by the parameter ¯ –eﬀectively limits
diversion, with larger values of ¯  corresponding to stronger legal investor protection.
In practice, there are diﬀerent ways how a controlling shareholder can extract private
beneﬁts at the expense of other investors. For instance, he can sell target assets or output
below their market value to another company he owns. Alternatively, he can pay himself an
artiﬁcially high salary or consume perks while declaring them as necessary business expenses.
Johnson et al. (2000) describe how–even in countries like France, Belgium, and Italy–
5If there are multiple bidders, it is important that the execution cost is only incurred by the winning
bidder. Otherwise–at least when the bidding outcome is deterministic–there would never be any bidding
competition as the losing bidder would not be able to break even.
6Our assumption that private beneﬁts are not pledgeable rules out the possibility that the bidder can
directly pledge target assets as collateral even if he does not fully own the target, as discussed in Mueller
and Panunzi (2004). Such arrangements, which rely on second-step mergers between the target and a shell
company owned by the bidder, are not available in all countries. Even in the United States, their role has
become limited due to the widespread adoption of (anti-)business combination laws.
7controlling shareholders can extract private beneﬁts by transferring company resources to
themselves (“tunneling”). Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), Bae, Kang, and Kim
(2002), Atanasov (2005), and Mironov (2008) provide further examples of tunneling from
India, Korea, Bulgaria, and Russia, respectively.7
To study the ﬁnancing of takeovers, we assume the bidder has internal funds,  In
addition, the bidder can raise outside funds,  from competitive investors. Since private
beneﬁts are not pledgeable, the amount of outside funds which the bidder can raise is limited
by the value of his security beneﬁts. We impose no restriction on the type of ﬁnancial claims
which the bidder can issue against these security beneﬁts, except that their value must be
non-decreasing in the underlying security beneﬁts.
T h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s .
In stage 1, the bidder decides whether to bid for the target. If he decides to bid, he can
raise outside funds,  in addition to his internal funds,  and make a take-it-or-leave-it,
conditional, unrestricted cash tender oﬀer with bid price .
In stage 2, the target shareholders simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether
to tender their shares. The fraction of tendered shares is denoted by  If 05 the
takeover fails. Conversely, if  ≥ 05 the takeover succeeds, tendering shareholders receive
a cash payment equal to the bid price, and the bidder incurs the execution cost, 
In stage 3, if the bidder gains control of the target, he diverts a fraction (1 − ) of its
v a l u ea sp r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts, subject to the constraint  ≥ ¯  imposed by the law.
To select among multiple equilibria, we apply the Pareto-dominance criterion, which
selects the equilibrium outcome with the highest payoﬀ for the target shareholders (e.g.,
Grossman and Hart, 1980; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1998; Mueller and Panunzi, 2004).
Among other things, this implies our focus on value-increasing takeovers is without any loss
of generality. Indeed, any equilibrium of the tendering subgame in which a value-decreasing
takeover succeeds is dominated by an equilibrium in which the takeover fails, where the
latter equilibrium always exists.8 Thus, Pareto dominance rules out what is, by all means,
7Barclay and Holderness (1989), Nenova (2003), and Dyck and Zingales (2004) are empirical studies
documenting the value of private beneﬁts of control.
8There always exists a Nash equilibrium–in fact, a continuum of Nash equilibria–in which the takeover
fails. If it is anticipated that a majority of the target shareholders does not tender, any individual shareholder
8an implausible scenario, namely, that target shareholders would tender to a bidder for a price
below the status quo value.9
The model is solved by backward induction. We ﬁrst consider the bidder’s diversion
decision, followed by the target shareholders’ tendering decision and the bidder’s oﬀer and
ﬁnancing decisions. Generally, a successful bid must win the target shareholders’ approval
and match any competing oﬀer. We examine both the case in which shareholder approval
is the binding constraint (“single-bidder case”) and the case in which outbidding of rivals is
the binding constraint (“bidding competition”).
3S i n g l e - B i d d e r C a s e
The single-bidder assumption does not literally rule out that there are other bidders inter-
ested in controlling the target. It merely presumes that none is able to create nearly as much
value as the bidder under consideration. By implication, shareholder approval is the binding
constraint for a successful takeover.
Consider ﬁrst stage 3, where the bidder must decide how much value to divert as private
beneﬁts. If the bidder gains control, he chooses  to maximize
− ()+( 1− ) (1)
where  is the value of the security beneﬁts associated with the bidder’s equity stake,
() is the value of the claims issued against these security beneﬁts as part of the
takeover’s ﬁnancing, and (1 − ) are the bidder’s private beneﬁts. Since, by assumption,
 is non-decreasing in the underlying security beneﬁts, the bidder’s objective function is
decreasing in  implying that maximum diversion is optimal:  = ¯ .10 Thus, legal investor
is indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering, implying that failure can always be supported as an
equilibrium outcome. Note that while unconditional oﬀers may avoid problems of multiple equilibria, they
suﬀer from problems of nonexistence of equilibrium (e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988).
9Grossman and Hart (1980, p. 47) also argue that bids below the status quo value are implausible, for
the same reason, namely, because they fail whenever they are expected to fail. Naturally, a value-decreasing
takeover (0) might succeed if the bidder makes an oﬀer above the status quo value,  ≥ 0. However,
making such an oﬀer would violate the bidder’s participation constraint.
10Taking the derivative of (1) with respect to  yields −0()− Given that 0 is non-negative,
9protection imposes a binding constraint on diversion, and the value of the security beneﬁts
increases with the quality of legal investor protection.11
Consider next stage 2, where the target shareholders must decide whether to tender their
shares. Being atomistic, target shareholders tender only if the bid price equals or exceeds
the post-takeover value of the security beneﬁts (Bradley, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1980).
Consequently, a successful tender oﬀer must satisfy the “free-rider condition,”
 ≥ ¯  (2)
If this condition holds with equality, target shareholders are indiﬀerent between tendering and
not tendering. Without loss of generality, we break the indiﬀerence in favor of tendering.1213
Thus, if the takeover succeeds, it succeeds with  =1 
Consider ﬁnally stage 1, where the bidder must choose the oﬀer price  and secure ﬁ-
nancing for the takeover. A successful oﬀer must satisfy the free-rider condition (2) as well
as two further conditions. First, the oﬀer must satisfy the bidder’s participation constraint.
For  =1 , this constraint can be written as
 −  −  ≥ 0 (3)
Note that the claims issued to outside investors and the funds provided by them do not
appear in the participation constraint. They cancel out as investors are competitive.
Second, the oﬀer must satisfy the bidder’s budget constraint. For  =1 ,t h i sc o n s t r a i n t
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
 + ¯  ≥  +  (4)
The LHS is the bidder’s total budget. Indeed, the bidder can pledge to outside investors
 = ¯  is a global maximum. This maximum is unique if 1 or if 0(¯ )  0
11That private beneﬁts of control are decreasing in the quality of legal investor protection is consistent
with empirical evidence by Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004).
12See Grossman and Hart (1980, pp. 45-47). A common motivation for this assumption is that the bidder
could always break the indiﬀerence by raising the bid price inﬁnitesimally.
13A small (technical) caveat: we break the indiﬀerence in favor of tendering only if the outcome is such
that the takeover succeeds. This means that failure can still be supported as an equilibrium outcome.
10no more than the value of the security beneﬁts associated with his (future) stake,  =1 ,
implying his outside funding capacity is limited to ¯ .14 The RHS represents the bidder’s
need for funds, which includes the bid price, ,a sw e l la st h ee x e c u t i o nc o s t ,.
Lowering the bid price increases the bidder’s objective function–i.e., the LHS of (3)–
while relaxing both his budget constraint and his participation constraint. Therefore, the
optimal bid is such that the free-rider condition holds with equality:
 = ¯  (5)
Given (5), the bidder’s budget constraint becomes
 ≥  (6)
and his participation constraint becomes
(1 − ) ≥  (7)
Importantly, the bidder’s budget constraint (6) does not depend on the quality of legal
investor protection, ¯ . In the original budget constraint (4)–i.e., before inserting the free-
rider condition (5)–the bidder’s outside funding capacity increases with . Indeed, stronger
legal investor protection limits the ease with which the bidder can extract private beneﬁts
at the expense of other investors. This increases his pledgeable income, thereby increasing
his outside funding capacity. However, once the free-rider condition is accounted for, the
increased outside funding capacity does not relax the bidder’s budget constraint as the bid
price–and thus the bidder’s need for funds–must increase in lockstep:  = ¯ . Ultimately,
the budget constraint is thus independent of ¯ .15 Furthermore, with all pledgeable value
14Our assumption that private beneﬁts are not pledgeable–while security beneﬁts are fully pledgeable–
simpliﬁes the exposition but is stronger than what is needed here. Ultimately, what is needed is that
security beneﬁts are more pledegable than private beneﬁts. This is plausible, especially if private beneﬁts
come (partly) in the form of consumption (e.g., perks) or are obtained in “semi-legal” ways (e.g., tunneling).
Also, if security beneﬁts were not fully pledgeable, this would create a wedge between the bid price and the
bidder’s pledgeable income even in the single-bidder case. Currently, such a wedge exists in our model only
in the multi-bidder case.
15If the budget constraint (6) is slack, the amount of external funds raised by the bidder is indeterminate.
11being captured by the target shareholders, none of this value can be used to raise funds to
cover the execution cost, . Accordingly, the execution cost must be funded entirely out of
the bidder’s internal funds, .
The more familiar participation constraint (7) reﬂects the fact that free-riding by target
shareholders limits the bidder’s proﬁts from the takeover to his private beneﬁts net of the
execution cost, . Stronger legal investor protection reduces the bidder’s private beneﬁts,
thereby tightening his participation constraint.
Combining (6) and (7), we have the following result.
Lemma 1. The bidder takes over the target if and only if
min{(1 − )} ≥  (8)
In sum, legal investor protection aﬀects the takeover outcome in two ways. On the
one hand, stronger legal investor protection reduces the bidder’s proﬁts, making eﬃcient
takeovers less likely. On the other hand, stronger legal investor protection increases the
bidder’s pledgeable income, thereby increasing his outside funding capacity. This latter
eﬀect is immaterial, however, as the bid price–and thus the bidder’s need for funds–must
increase in lockstep with his pledgeable income.16
We conclude this section by examining the eﬀect of legal investor protection on the
likelihood that eﬃcient takeovers succeed. In condition (8), the LHS decreases (weakly)
with  Therefore, as legal investor protection becomes stronger, it becomes less likely that
the bidder takes over the target.17
Proposition 1. Absent eﬀective competition for the target, stronger legal investor protection
makes it less likely that eﬃcient takeovers succeed: it does not relax the bidder’s ﬁnancing
This is because the bidder is indiﬀerent between ﬁnancing the bid partly with his remaining internal funds,
 −  and ﬁnancing it with external funds.
16Notice the diﬀerence to the standard corporate ﬁnance model of investment (e.g., Tirole, 2006, Chapters
3 and 4). In the standard corporate ﬁnance model, increasing pledgeable income relaxes the entrepreneur’s
ﬁnancing constraint and improves eﬃciency. In contrast, here, increasing pledgeable income does not relax
the bidder’s ﬁnancing constraint, because the “investment cost” increases one-for-one with the pledgeable
income. On the contrary, increasing pledgeable income worsens eﬃciency by reducing the bidder’s proﬁts.
17Here, and elsewhere, we say that an event is more likely if it occurs for a larger set of parameter values.
12constraint but reduces his proﬁts from the takeover.
Conditional on the takeover succeeding, target shareholders beneﬁt from stronger legal
investor protection, because it raises the bid price. However, this has no implications for
eﬃciency: it merely constitutes a wealth transfer from the bidder to the target sharehold-
ers. In contrast, the adverse eﬀect of legal investor protection on the bidder’s participation
constraint has implications for eﬃciency, as it makes it more likely that eﬃcient takeovers
will not succeed in the ﬁrst place.
Turning the above result on its head, if the bid price did not increase in lockstep with the
bidder’s pledgeable income, then the positive eﬀect of stronger legal investor protection on
the bidder’s outside funding capacity might have implications for eﬃciency. There are many
reasons for why the bid price may not increase in lockstep with the bidder’s pledgeable
income. For instance, ﬁnancing frictions may prevent bidders from raising outside funds
against the full value of their security beneﬁts. Another reason is bidding competition,
where the bidders are forced to make oﬀers exceeding the value of their security beneﬁts.
4 Bidding Competition
As we have remarked earlier, the single-bidder case does not literally rule out that there
are multiple bidders competing for the target. It merely implies that such competition is
ineﬀective, in the sense that the binding constraint is shareholder approval–given by the
free-rider condition (5)–and not outbidding of rivals. Eﬀective bidding competition, by
deﬁnition, implies that the requirement to outbid rivals, rather than winning shareholder
approval, determines the winning bid price.
We consider two potential bidders, bidder 1 and bidder 2, competing to gain control of
the target. Bidder  =1 2 has internal funds .I fb i d d e r gains control, the target value
increases to   0 where 1  2 without loss of generality. Regardless of which bidder
gains control, his ability to divert ﬁr mv a l u ea sp r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts is limited by the same legal
environment, . (Section 5.3 considers the case in which bidders come from diﬀerent legal
environments.) The takeover process is the same as in the single-bidder case, except that
both bidders make their oﬀers, 1 and 2, simultaneously.
13In stage 3, as before, the controlling bidder ﬁnds it optimal to divert a fraction (1 − ¯ )
of the target value as private beneﬁts. In stage 2, target shareholders can be faced with up
to two oﬀers. The case of a single oﬀer is as before. The case of two oﬀe r si sa sf o l l o w s .
Lemma 2. In a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, the winning bid is the highest bid among
those satisfying  ≥ ,i fa n y .
In stage 1, the bidders must decide whether to bid for the target. If so, they make their
oﬀers simultaneously. Denote by b  the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to
make. That is, b  is the highest value of  satisfying the bidder’s participation constraint,
 ≥  +  (9)
and his budget constraint,
 + ¯  ≥  +  (10)
Given (9) and (10), the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to make is
b  = ¯  +m i n
©
(1 − ) 
ª
−  (11)
The ﬁrst term on the RHS represents the security beneﬁts if bidder  gains control of the
target. The bidder is both willing and able to pay for these beneﬁts as he can pledge their
value to outside investors. The third term is the execution cost, . All else equal, it reduces
the bidder’s willingness to pay for the target. The second term is the minimum of the
bidder’s private beneﬁts and his internal funds, which increase his willingness and ability,
respectively, to pay for the target.
Lemma 3. Bidder 1 wins the takeover contest if and only if
min
©






(1 − )2 2
ª
− (1 − 2) (13)
14The result lays out two conditions for bidder 1 to win the takeover contest. The ﬁrst
condition, (12), states that bidder 1 must be willing to incur and able to fund the execution
cost, . This condition is the same as in the single-bidder case. It is independent of bidder
2’s presence or his characteristics. If the condition does not hold, there is either no bidding
competition or no bidding at all.18 To allow for bidding competition, we henceforth assume
that  is small enough so that condition (12) holds.
Assumption 1. min
©
(1 − )1 1
ª
≥ 
The second condition, (13), arises solely due to bidding competition. It determines under
what conditions bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer, b 1 exceeds bidder 2’s maximum oﬀer, b 2 As is
shown, bidder 1’s internal funds, 1 must exceed some minimum threshold. Accordingly, the
RHS of (13) captures the extent to which bidding competition tightens bidder 1’s budget
constraint. Importantly, the RHS decreases with . Hence, as legal investor protection
improves, competition has less of a tightening eﬀect on bidder 1’s budget, making it more
likely that he can outbid his less eﬃcient rival, bidder 2.
Proposition 2. Under eﬀective competition for the target, stronger legal investor protection
promotes eﬃcient takeover outcomes.
When the more eﬃcient bidder is wealthier (1 ≥ 2), condition (13) always holds,
irrespective of the quality of legal investor protection. Indeed, bidder 1 not only has a
higher valuation for the target, but he also has a larger budget: he has both more internal
funds (1 ≥ 2) and a higher outside funding capacity (1  2). Thus, while bidder
2’s presence may very well force bidder 1 to raise his bid, it will never exhaust his budget
constraint. By implication, bidder 1 always wins the takeover contest, and the quality of
legal investor protection is irrelevant for the takeover outcome.
Suppose now that the less eﬃcient bidder is wealthier (1  2). When legal investor
protection is weak, the outcome is now more likely to be ineﬃcient. As an illustration,
consider the admittedly extreme case in which investors enjoy no legal protection at all
18If min
©
(1 − )1 1
ª
=( 1− )1  then both bidders’ participation constraints are violated as
min
©
(1 − )2 2
ª
≤ (1 − )2  (1 − )1 In that case, there is no bidding at all.
15( =0 ). In that case, the two bidders have no outside funding capacity and must rely entirely
on their own funds to ﬁnance their bids. While bidder 1 has a higher valuation for the target,
his budget is tighter than bidder 2’s budget, possibly so tight as to prevent him from making
an oﬀer exceeding bidder 2’s oﬀer. In that case, bidder 2 wins the takeover contest, implying
that the outcome is ineﬃcient. As legal investor protection becomes stronger, both bidders
can pledge a larger fraction of ﬁrm value to outside investors, which relaxes both their budget
constraints. However, because bidder 1 can create more value, his budget increases more
than bidder 2’s budget, making it more likely that he can outbid his less eﬃcient rival, bidder
2.19
Formally, it follows from condition (13) that if 1 ≥ min{2 2} the takeover outcome
is eﬃcient for any value of  i.e., irrespective of the legal environment. Conversely, if
1  min{2 2} there exists a critical value, 
0
 such that the takeover outcome is eﬃcient
if and only if  ≥ 
0

We conclude this section by examining whether–conditional on the takeover succeeding–
target shareholders beneﬁt from stronger legal investor protection. To win the takeover con-
test, a bidder must not only outbid his rival, but his oﬀer must also satisfy the free-rider
condition. Accordingly, the winning bid is ∗




for  6=  As the losing bid-
der’s maximum bid, b  is (weakly) increasing in  the winning bid, ∗
 is also (weakly)
increasing in  Hence, conditional on the takeover succeeding, target shareholders beneﬁt
from stronger legal investor protection as it raises the winning bid price.
Intuitively, stronger legal investor protection aﬀects the bid price through two channels.
First, it increases the value of the security beneﬁts regardless of the winning bidder’s identity
( increases with ), thus forcing each bidder to raise his bid. Second, stronger legal in-
vestor protection increases both bidders’ outside funding capacity, allowing them to compete
more ﬁercly for the target’s shares (b  increases weakly with ) For both reasons, stronger
legal investor protection raises the winning bid price. Consistent with this result, Rossi and
Volpin (2004) ﬁnd that takeover premia are higher in countries with stronger legal investor
protection.
19In the budget constraint (10), the LHS increases with  at a rate of  Since 1  2 a given increase
in  increases bidder 1’s budget more than it increases bidder 2’s budget.
165 Implications
We next explore a number of implications of our analysis. For simplicity, we assume that
 =0 . Incorporating 0 into our analysis is straightforward but does not yield any new
insights given that Assumption 1 holds.
5.1 “One Share—One Vote”
This section studies the implications of departures from “one share—one vote” for the eﬃ-
ciency of the takeover outcome. Suppose the target has a dual-class share system: a fraction
 ∈ (01] of the target’s shares have (equal) voting rights, while the remaining shares are
non-voting. A “one share—one vote” structure corresponds to  =1 .
In stage 3, as before, the controlling bidder ﬁnds it optimal to divert a fraction (1 − ¯ )
of the target value as private beneﬁts. In stage 2, target shareholders of diﬀerent voting
classes may face diﬀerent bids, which they each must accept or reject. That is, we explicitly
allow bidders to make diﬀerent bids for voting and non-voting shares. As it turns out, this
problem can be simpliﬁed.
Lemma 4. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that bidders make a bid only for
voting shares.
From the bidder’s perspective, it is immaterial whether or not he acquires non-voting
shares: they do not help him gain control. Thus, the maximum he is willing to pay for
non-voting shares is their “fundamental” value, 20 (In contrast, as shown in the previous
section, bidders may oﬀer a higher price for voting shares to gain control of the target.) Also,
due to free-riding, non-voting shareholders will tender only if the bid price is at least 
Accordingly, the only price at which a transaction may occur is . At this, price, however,
both parties (bidder and non-voting shareholders) are indiﬀerent between trading and not
trading. Thus, without any loss of generality, we can assume that bidders do not make a bid
for non-voting shares.
20As is customary in the literature, we always express bids in terms of a measure one of shares. Given
that a fraction (1 − ) of the target’s shares are non-voting, this means the bidder is willing to pay up to
(1 − ) for all of the non-voting shares.
17The target shareholders’ tendering decision is as in Section 4. Hence, Lemma 2 applies,
and the voting shareholders tender to the highest bidder oﬀering  ≥ ,i fa n y .I ns t a g e
1, the bidders must decide whether to bid for the target. Thus, we must again characterize
the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to make, b () i.e., the highest value of
 satisfying the bidder’s participation constraint,
¯  +( 1− ) ≥  (14)
and his budget constraint,
 + ¯  ≥  (15)
In the participation constraint (14), ¯  is the value of the security beneﬁts associated
with voting shares, (1 − ) are the bidder’s private beneﬁts, and  is the total payout
to voting shareholders. In the budget constraint (15), the LHS is the bidder’s total budget,
consisting of his internal funds, , and his outside funding capacity, ¯  while the RHS
captures the bidder’s need for funds.
Given (14) and (15), the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to make is





(1 − ) 
ª
 (16)
This expression resembles (11), except that  =0  and except that the second term on the
RHS is normalized by the fraction of voting shares,  Indeed, when not all shares carry a
vote, the bidder’s willingness and ability to pay, respectively, is spread across fewer shares.
This increases the maximum oﬀer he is willing and able to make (for voting shares). In
particular, the bidder’s willingness to pay is higher, because he can now obtain the same
private beneﬁts, (1 − ), by acquiring fewer shares. Likewise, his ability to pay is higher,
because he can now use his given wealth,  for the acquisition of fewer shares.
Lemma 5. Bidder 1 wins the takeover contest if and only if
1 ≥ min
©
(1 − )2 2
ª
− (1 − 2) (17)
18By inspection, the RHS of (17) decreases with . Thus, the likelihood that bidder 1 wins
the takeover contest is highest under a “one share—one vote” structure.21
Proposition 3. “One share—one vote” is socially optimal.
When the more eﬃcient bidder is wealthier (1 ≥ 2), condition (17) holds for any value
of  That is, the takeover outcome is always eﬃcient, irrespective of the fraction of voting
shares. The intuition is the same as before: not only does bidder 1 have a higher valuation
for the target, but he also has a larger budget. Hence, bidder 1 can always outbid his less
eﬃcient rival, bidder 2
Suppose now that the less eﬃc i e n tb i d d e ri sw e a l t h i e r( 1  2). If 1 is suﬃciently large,
the takeover outcome is again eﬃcient, irrespective of the fraction of voting shares. This
situation–i.e., when both bidders are ﬁnancially unconstrained–is the situation analyzed
in much of the theory of takeovers. By contrast, if 1 is suﬃciently small, the takeover
outcome may be ineﬃcient. Indeed, while bidder 1 has a higher willingness to pay for the
target, bidder 2’s ability to pay may be higher due to his larger wealth. As an illustration,
consider expression (16), which characterizes the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and
able to make. If  ≤ (1 − ) this expression becomes




Even though bidder 2 generates lower security beneﬁts (¯ 2  ¯ 1), his maximum oﬀer may
be higher than bidder 1’s if 2 is suﬃciently larger than 1 Moreover, the smaller is ,t h e
less of a wealth diﬀerence 2 − 1 is necessary for bidder 2 to outbid his rival, bidder 1.
Intuitively, the eﬀect of bidder wealth on the takeover outcome is larger when  is smaller,
because a given wealth can then be spread across fewer voting shares.
Formally, it follows from condition (17) that if 1 ≥ min
©
(1 − )2 2
ª
 the takeover
outcome is eﬃcient for any value of  i.e., irrespective of the fraction of voting shares.
By contrast, if 1  min
©
(1 − )2 2
ª
− (1 − 2) the takeover outcome is ineﬃcient
21As can be easily shown, the security-voting structure (i.e., ) is irrelevant in the single-bidder case.









such that the takeover outcome is eﬃcient if and only if  ≥ b  By inspection, b  decreases
with ¯  Hence, departures from “one share—one vote” are more likely to lead to an ineﬃcient
takeover outcome when legal investor protection is weak. (Conversely, weak legal investor
protection is more likely to lead to an ineﬃcient takeover outcome when the fraction of voting
shares,  is small.)
Corollary 1. Deviations from “one share—one vote” are more likely to lead to ineﬃcient
takeover outcomes when legal investor protection is weak.
Our results must be contrasted with those of Grossman and Hart (1988, GH) and Harris
and Raviv (1988, HR), who also ﬁnd that “one share—one vote” is socially optimal. The
economics of the results, however, are fundamentally diﬀerent. In their models, departures
from “one share—one vote” may allow bidders with low security beneﬁts but high private
beneﬁts to win against bidders with high security beneﬁts but low private beneﬁts, even
if the former are less eﬃcient–i.e., even if they generate lower total (security + private)
beneﬁts. In our model, this is not possible, as security and private beneﬁts are positively
related. That is, our model assumes that bidders can divert more value in absolute (i.e.,
dollar) terms from more valuable ﬁrms. In contrast, in both GH and HR, bidders may divert
more value in absolute terms from less valuable ﬁrms.
T h ec o n v e r s ei sa l s ot r u e :t h em a i ni n e ﬃciency in our model–which is minimized under
a “one share—one vote” structure–cannot arise in GH and HR. The main ineﬃciency in
our model is not that less eﬃcient bidders may have a higher willingness to pay, as in GH
and HR, but rather that they may have a higher ability to pay. Hence, the sole reason
why eﬃcient takeovers may not take place in our model is because bidders are ﬁnancially
constrained. In contrast, in both GH and HR, bidders are arbitrarily wealthy, so ﬁnancing
constraints play no role.
205.2 Sales of Controlling Blocks
This section extends our analysis to the case of a target with a controlling shareholder
(“incumbent”). The incumbent owns a fraction  ≥ 05 of the target’s shares and generates
ﬁrm value 0 ≥ 0 which is divided into security beneﬁts 0 and private beneﬁts (1 − )0.
The target faces a (single) potential acquirer (“bidder”). If the bidder gains control of the
target, its value increases to 1  0.
A transfer of control must be mutually beneﬁcial, since the incumbent can block the
transfer at will. Accordingly, a transfer of control may occur only if the bidder is willing
and able to compensate the incumbent for the sale of his controlling block. Consistent
with the law and legal practice in the United States, we assume that the target’s minority
shareholders enjoy no rights in this sale-of-control transaction. In particular, the bidder is
under no obligation to extend his oﬀer to the target’s minority shareholders. In fact, he is
under no obligation to make them any oﬀer at all.22
In stage 3, as before, the bidder diverts a fraction (1 − ¯ ) of the target value as private
beneﬁts. In stage 2, the incumbent and the minority shareholders may face diﬀerent bids,
w h i c ht h e ye a c hm u s ta c c e p to rr e j e c t .N o t i c et h ea n a l o g yt oo u rp r e v i o u sa n a l y s i si nS e c t i o n
5.1. There, we assumed, without loss of generality, that bidders do not make a bid for non-
voting shares. Similarly, here, the bidder has nothing to gain from acquiring minority shares:
they do not help him gain control, and the only price at which a transaction may occur is
at their “fundamental” value, 1 making everybody indiﬀerent between trading and not
trading. As in Lemma 4, we can thus assume, without loss of generality, that the bidder
does not make a bid for minority shares.
We must again characterize the highest oﬀer which the bidder is willing and able to make,
b 1() i.e., the highest value of 1 satisfying his participation constraint,
¯ 1 +( 1− )1 ≥ 1 (20)
22This rule is known as “market rule” (MR, see Bebchuk, 1994). It is the prevailing rule in the United
States. Given that the MR imposes no obligation on the acquirer whatsoever, “the MR is probably best
described as the absence of a rule, rather than a rule” (Schuster, 2010, p. 8). Many other countries, including
most European countries, use a diﬀerent rule–the “equal opportunity rule” or “mandatory bid rule”–which
r e q u i r e st h eb i d d e rt om a k ea no ﬀe rt ot h et a r g e t ’ sm i n o r i t ys h a r e h o l d e r so nt h es a m et e r m sa sh i so ﬀer for
the controlling block.
21and his budget constraint,
1 + ¯ 1 ≥ 1 (21)
Conditions (20) and (21) are similar to (14) and (15), except that  is replaced with 
Accordingly, the highest oﬀer which the bidder is willing and able to make is





(1 − )1 1
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 (22)
whereas the incumbent’s valuation for the controlling block is
0 = 0 +( 1− )0 (23)
For a sale-of-control transaction to occur, the bidder’s maximum oﬀer for the controlling
block, b 1 must equal or exceed the incumbent’s valuation for the controlling block, 0.23
Otherwise, there are no gains from trade.24
Lemma 6. The bidder acquires the controlling block if and only if
1 ≥ (1 − )0 − (1 − 0) (24)
Condition (24) is similar to condition (17). The latter condition reﬂects the requirement
that bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer for all of the voting shares, b 1 must exceed bidder 2’s
maximum oﬀer, b 2 Likewise, condition (24) states that the bidder’s maximum oﬀer for the
controlling block, b 1 must exceed the incumbent’s valuation, 0 The main diﬀerence is
that the incumbent’s wealth does not enter in condition (24). As the incumbent already
owns the controlling block, his ability to pay for it is irrelevant. In a sense, the incumbent
is like a rival bidder who is arbitrarily wealthy.
By inspection, the RHS of (24) decreases with . Thus, the likelihood that the sale of
control takes place increases with the size of the controlling block.
23Recall that we always express bids in terms of a measure one of shares. Thus, if the highest oﬀer which
the bidder is willing and able to make is b 1 this implies his maximum oﬀer for the controlling block is b 1
24The sale will occur at a price  ∈ [0b 1] depending on the incumbent’s and bidder’s relative bar-
gaining powers. For our purposes, the value of  i sn o ti m p o r t a n t ,a si td o e sn o ta ﬀect eﬃciency.
22Proposition 4. Eﬃcient sales of control are more likely to occur when the controlling block
is large (as a fraction of total shares).
Recall that the incumbent’s wealth plays no role: he can always “aﬀord” the controlling
block by simply refusing to sell it. Accordingly, whether or not the sale of control takes
place depends solely on the bidder’s wealth, 1 If 1 is suﬃciently large, the sale of control
always takes place, irrespective of the size of the controlling block. Thus, once again, absent
ﬁnancial constraints, the takeover outcome is always eﬃcient.
In contrast, if the bidder is ﬁnancially constrained, the sale of control may not take
place. The intuition is analogous to our previous analysis. In Section 5.1, a smaller voting
block,  ampliﬁed the advantage of the wealthier (but less eﬃcient) bidder. Here, a smaller
controlling block, ,a m p l i ﬁes the advantage of the wealthier (but less eﬃcient) incumbent.
Formally, it follows from condition (24) that if 1 ≥ (1 − )0 −

2(1 − 0) t h es a l eo f
control always takes place, irrespective of the size of the controlling block. By contrast, if
1  (1 − )0 − (1 − 0) the sale of control never takes place. In all intermediate cases,
there exists a critical value, b  ≥ 05 given by
b  =
(1 − )0 − 1
(1 − 0)
 (25)
such that the sale of control takes place if and only if  ≥ b  By inspection, b  decreases with
¯  Thus, eﬃcient sales of control are more likely to occur when legal investor protection is
strong.
Corollary 2. Stronger legal investor protection promotes eﬃcient sales of control.
Bebchuk (1994) also ﬁnds that eﬃcient sales of control may not take place, albeit for
ad i ﬀerent reason. In his model, an incumbent with low security beneﬁts but high private
beneﬁts may not sell his controlling stake to a potential acquirer with high security beneﬁts
but low private beneﬁts, even if the sale of control is eﬃcient. In our model, this is not
possible, as security and private beneﬁts are positively related. Instead, eﬃcient sales of
control may not take place in our model because bidders are ﬁnancially constrained. In
23contrast, in Bebchuk’s model, bidders are arbitrarily wealthy, so ﬁnancing constraints play
no role.
So far, we have taken the size of the controlling block,  as given. We now discuss how
it can be endogenized. Suppose the incumbent is initially the ﬁrm’s sole owner. In the spirit
of Zingales (1995), he can retain a controlling block,  ≥ 05 and sell the remaining shares,
1 −  to dispersed investors. As in Zingales’ analysis, everybody has rational expectations
about the (future) control transfer. For simplicity, we assume the bidder has full bargaining
power when negotiating the sale of control with the incumbent.
From our previous analysis, we know that the sale of control succeeds if and only if
condition (24) holds. In that case, the bidder acquires the controlling block at a price equal
to the incumbent’s valuation,
0 +( 1− )0 (26)
(If the bidder did not have full bargaining power, expression (26) would have to be modiﬁed
accordingly.)
When the incumbent sells shares to dispersed investors, they rationally anticipate the
control transfer and are thus willing to pay up to (1 − )1 for the minority shares. Overall,
and as long as condition (24) holds, the incumbent’s total payoﬀ is therefore
0 +( 1− )0 +( 1− )1 (27)
Given that 1  0 the incumbent’s total payoﬀ decreases with . On the other hand,
condition (24) becomes tighter as  decreases. Consequently, the incumbent chooses the
smallest value of  ≥ 05 that is compatible with condition (24).
Proposition 5. The incumbent’s optimal controlling stake is

∗ =m a x
½





Zingales (1995) also models the incumbent’s choice of a controlling stake in anticipation
of a future control transfer. Moreover, he also assumes that the bidder is more eﬃcient than
the incumbent. However, Zingales assumes that the bidder is arbitrarily wealthy. In our
24model, if the bidder is suﬃciently wealthy, the optimal controlling stake is always 
∗ =0 5
In contrast, if the bidder is ﬁnancially constrained–precisely, if 1  (1−)0−

2(1−0)–
the incumbent’s problem has a non-trivial solution 
∗ =[ ( 1− )0 − 1](1 − 0)  05
By inspection, 
∗ decreases with the quality of legal investor protection, 
Corollary 3. The optimal controlling stake is larger when legal investor protection is weak.
This result is consistent with evidence by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), who ﬁnd that
ownership is more concentrated in countries with weaker legal investor protection.
5.3 Cross-Border M&A
This section extends our analysis to the case in which bidders come from diﬀerent legal
environments. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1  2. That is, bidder 1 comes
from an environment with stronger legal investor protection than bidder 2. To isolate the
eﬀect of diﬀerences in legal investor protection on the takeover outcome, we assume that
both bidders have the same internal funds,  and can create the same value, 
In a typical cross-border M&A transaction, the target adopts the corporate governance
structures, accounting standards, and disclosure practices of the country of the acquirer
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2009).25 Hence,
if bidder  wins the takeover contest, his private beneﬁts are (1 − ) while the security
beneﬁts accruing to all shareholders, including the bidder himself, are  Note that–in
contrast to our previous analysis–private and security beneﬁts are now inversely related:
while bidder 1 generates higher security beneﬁts, his private beneﬁts are lower than bidder
2’s. Also note that–again in contrast to our previous analysis–both bidders now generate
the same total (security + private) beneﬁts. From an eﬃciency standpoint, it is therefore
immaterial who wins the takeover contest. Accordingly, the question is not whether eﬃcient
takeovers take place, but rather if, and under what conditions, bidders from environments
with stronger legal investor protection can outbid rivals from environments with weaker legal
investor protection.
25As Rossi and Volpin (2004) point out, cross-border M&A is an important channel for the worldwide
functional convergence of corporate governance standards in the sense of Coﬀee (1999), i.e., “eﬀective”
convergence without any formal changes in the law.
25In principle, the target’s minority shareholder protection could become worse if the ac-
quirer comes from an environment with weaker legal investor protection.26 Empirically, this
case seems less relevant, however. In the vast majority of cross-border M&A deals, the
acquirer comes from a country with stronger, not weaker, legal investor protection (Rossi
and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2009), implying that
“[o]n average, shareholder protection increases in the target company via the cross-border
deal” (Rossi and Volpin, 2004, p. 291). To avoid this issue altogether, we assume that legal
investor protection in the home country of the target, 0, is less than or equal to 2 In the
special case where 0 = 2 our model thus analyzes competition between a domestic bidder
(bidder 2) and a foreign bidder (bidder 1) coming from a country with stronger legal investor
protection.
The analysis is analogous to Section 4, except that  is bidder-speciﬁc, while both 
and  are identical across bidders. Accordingly, bidder ’s maximum oﬀer is





Proposition 6. If (1 − 2) the bidder from the country with stronger legal investor
protection wins the takeover contest. Otherwise, either of the two bidders may win the
takeover contest.
As both bidders can create the same value,  they have the same willingness to pay.
Hence, the takeover outcome depends solely on the bidders’ ability to pay. There are three
cases.
If  ≥ (1 − 2), neither bidder is ﬁnancially constrained. As a result, both bidders can
make a bid up to their full valuation of the target,  which implies either of the two bidders
may win the takeover contest. Observe that the winning bidder makes zero proﬁt, just like
in the single-bidder case.
The second case, (1 − 2)≥ (1 − 1) illustrates perhaps best the strategic
advantage of strong legal investor protection in takeover contests. While both bidders can
26“The target almost always adopts the governance standards of the acquirers, whether good or bad”
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004, p. 300, italics added). Likewise, “the new law can be less protective than before, a
type of legal reform that is unheard of in the literature” (Bris and Cabolis, 2008, p. 606).
26create the same value,  bidder 1 generates more security beneﬁts. Bidder 1 has therefore a
higher outside funding capacity, allowing him to make a bid up to his full valuation, b 1 = 
In contrast, bidder 2 c a no n l ym a k eab i du pt ob 2 = 2+ As a result, bidder 1 wins
the takeover contest.
The third case, (1−1) is similar to the second case, except that bidder 1 can no
longer make a bid up to his full valuation. Consequently, both bidders can now only bid up
to b  =  +  However, as bidder 1 generates more security beneﬁts, he can still outbid
his rival, bidder 2.
In sum, when bidders are ﬁnancially constrained, what matters is not only the total
value they can create, but also how this value is divided between security beneﬁts and
private beneﬁts. As private beneﬁts are not pledgeable, bidders with higher private beneﬁts
but lower security beneﬁts may face tighter budget constraints and, therefore, lose out to
bidders with lower private beneﬁts but higher security beneﬁts.
We may again ask if–conditional on the takeover succeeding–target shareholders beneﬁt
from stronger legal investor protection. In the ﬁrst case above, the winning bid is ∗
 = 
which is independent of  In contrast, in the second and third case, the winning bid is
∗
1 =m a x {b 21}, which is (weakly) increasing in the quality of legal investor protection
in the acquirer’s country, 1 Consistent with this result, Bris and Cabolis (2008) ﬁnd that
takeover premia in cross-border M&A deals are higher when the quality of legal investor
protection in the acquirer’s country is stronger than in the target’s country. Likewise, Rossi
and Volpin (2004) ﬁnd that takeover premia are higher in cross-border M&A deals relative
to domestic M&A deals, while the acquirer in a cross-border M&A deal is typically from a
country with stronger legal investor protection.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the eﬀects of legal investor protection on the eﬃciency of the market for
corporate control. Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which a bidder,
once in control, can divert corporate resources as private beneﬁts. This has two main impli-
cations. First, it reduces the bidder’s proﬁts from the takeover, making eﬃcient takeovers
27less likely. Second, it increases pledgeable income by increasing the post-takeover share
value, thereby increasing the bidder’s outside funding capacity. However, absent eﬀective
competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity does not relax the bidder’s
budget constraint as the bid price increases in lockstep.
In contrast, under eﬀective competition, stronger legal investor protection–and the re-
sulting increase in the bidders’ outside funding capacity–may improve the eﬃciency of the
takeover outcome. In particular, if bidders are ﬁnancially constrained, less eﬃcient but
wealthier bidders may be able to outbid more eﬃcient but less wealthy bidders. By boost-
ing bidders’ ability to raise funds against the value they can create, stronger legal investor
protection makes it more likely that the takeover outcome is determined by their ability to
create value rather than by their ﬁnancing constraints.
One implication of our analysis is that “one share—one vote” is socially optimal as it
maximizes the likelihood that the takeover outcome is determined by bidders’ ability to
create value rather than by their ﬁnancing constraints. Another implication is that eﬃcient
sales of controlling blocks are more likely to succeed when the controlling block is large and
when legal investor protection is strong. Finally, our analysis implies that when bidders from
diﬀerent countries compete over a target, those from countries with stronger legal investor
protection have a strategic advantage in the takeover contest.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. For a bid to succeed in equilibrium, it must satisfy the free-rider
condition,  ≥ .I fn ob i ds a t i s ﬁes this condition, the only equilibrium outcome is that the
takeover does not place. Suppose instead that a bid satisﬁes  ≥ . If a target shareholder
anticipates the bid to succeed, tendering his shares is (at least) a weakly dominant strategy.
Hence, an equilibrium exists in which a bid  succeeds if and only if  ≥ .A m o n g
all equilibria, the target shareholders’ payoﬀ is highest in those in which the highest bid
succeeds. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . For a bid to succeed under competition, it would a fortiori also
have to succeed absent competition. By Lemma 1, this is true if and only if condition (12)
28holds. Moreover, in a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, bidder 1 wins the takeover contest only
if b 1 ≥b 2. Using expression (11), this can be written as
¯ 1 +m i n
©
(1 − )1 1
ª
−  ≥ ¯ 2 +m i n
©










(1 − )2 2
ª
− (1 − 2) (31)
If (1 − )1 ≤ 1 this condition always holds because
(1 − )1 =( 1− )2 − (1 − 2) ≥ min
©
(1 − )2 2
ª
− (1 − 2)
Hence, condition (31) can be written as condition (13). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose bidder  bids  for voting shares and 0
 for non-voting
shares. Who wins the takeover contest is determined solely by the bids for voting shares.
Hence, in a Pareto-dominant equilibrium (for the voting shareholders), the winning bid is
the highest among those satisfying  ≥  if any. If bidder  fails to gain control, his
bid for non-voting shares is irrelevant. (Bids for non-voting shares are conditional upon
gaining control.) Conversely, if bidder  gains control, non-voting shareholders tender only
if 0
















Given the requirement that 0
 ≥  expression (32) is maximized for 0











which is the same as if bidder  did not bid for non-voting shares. Consequently, bidder  is
indiﬀerent between bidding and not bidding for non-voting shares: he makes zero proﬁto n
these shares, and they do not help him gain control. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 .The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3 with  =0and expression
29(11) replaced by (16). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3 with  =0and expression
(11) replaced by (22) (for the bidder) and
b 0 = 0 +
1

· (1 − )0 (34)
(for the incumbent), respectively. Q.E.D.
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